INTRODUCTION
If one has been brought up using truth tables, then a statement of the form "not-A" causes no problem ; that is "not-A" is true iff A is false. But if one wants to go beyond truth tables and yearns for a constructive interpretation then one finds that negative statements can be interpreted in more than one way. Since it is generally accepted that in a constructive interpretation a mathematical proposition A calls for some kind of construction and it is customary to say that the construction is a proof of A, we may interpret "not-A" in one of the following ways:
(1) there is no construction as required by A,
(2) the assumption that there is a construction that proves A leads to a contradiction; or more specifically, there is a construction x such that if p is a proof of A then n(p) is a proof of an absurdity,
in addition of having the concept of "a construction c proves a formula B" there is at hand the concept of "a construction d refutes a formula C" and there is a construction which refutes A.
The interpretation
which is related to Curry's non-demonstrability (see CURRY 1957 page 91) is clearly unsatisfactory from a constructive viewpoint because it asserts a lack of constructions.
(2) is the familiar intuitionistic interpretation for negation and there is no doubt that it has been a fruitful interpretation.
Nevertheless intuitionistic negation has certain unpleasant characteristics. For example, if one accepts that there is no construction that proves an absurdity (as do most people) then a salient property of the construction JC that proves "not-A" is that when n is applied to a particular non-existent construction (namely a proof of A) it yields another non-existent construction! The third interpretation does not have that problem. Of course it has other problems, probably the most damnable being that the number of primitive notions is increased.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the merits (if any) of taking refutation as the interpretation for negation. The paper is organized as follows: In section 1 we state some of the general properties that should be satisfied by the notion "the construction c is a refutation of the formula A". Based on the observations in section 1 we then set up a Gentzen style formalism in section 2. In Q 3 we present an adaptation of Kripke models and the (gist of the) completeness of the interpretation via Kripke models is given in $ 4. We end with sections 5, 6 where we consider elementary number theory with negation interpreted as refutation.
1. REFUTATION AS A PRIMITIVE NOTION
The concept "the wnstruction c proves the formula A" is common to most intuitionistic writings. In HEYTINCI 1966 it is considered in informal terms; more formal developments can be found in KFLEISEL 1962 , TROEL-STRA 1968 and in GOODMAN'S thesis 1968 In this section we wish to informally discuss the notion "the construction c refutes the formula A". Time will tell whether more formal developments are needed. First of all we should observe that how a construction c refutes a primitive (atomic) statement depends on the particular discipline that is being considered. Thus the ZogicuZZy valid formulae should not be dependent on how the primitive formulae are refuted; what is important is how compound statements are refuted.
Assuming certain basic operations on constructions, such as forming the construction which consists of the ordered pair of two constructions, the following conditions on "the construction c refutes the formula A" would probably be acceptable to most people: 
II.
It is decidable whether or not a given construction proves a formula. Similarly it is decidable whether or not a given construction refutes a formula. Of course it is possible for a given construction to neither prove nor refute a formula. On the other hand we do not think that it is reasonable to allow that a given construction c both proves and refutes a formula A (although it is possible that a given construction c proves a formula A and refutes another formula B, A #B).
III.
Suppose that c is a construction that refutes 7 A. That is c refutes that A is refutable. Hence from c we must be able to extract the information that no construction will ever refute A. Since we are assuming that no construction can both refute and prove the same formula and we know from c that no construction will ever refute A, it appears reasonable to stipulate that the construction c then proves A. (It could also be argued that the only way in which the construction c could encode the information that there will never be found a refutation of A is to encode a proof of A).
From the above remarks I, II, and III we then obtain viii. The construction c refutes 7 A iff c proves A 1).
2. AN AXIOMATIZATION FOR THE CALCULUS
Gentzen style axiomatizations are the formalizations which are simpler to justify on the intended interpretations of the logical operators. For the intuitionistic calculus it is possible to restrict oneself to sequents of the form r + 0 where r is a finite (possibly empty) sequence of formulae and 0 is either empty or consist of exactly one formula. The intended meaning of (the provable) A,J, . . . . A&-l + 0 is that there is a construction z such that if CO, . . . . ck-1 are constructions that prove Ao, . . ., AK-I then n(co, . . . . ct-1) is a construction that proves the formula in 0. Since it is rather difficult to visualize how we can have a construction that proves the formula occurring in the empty set of formulae we prefer to restrict ourselves to sequents of the form: Ao, . . . . AH + B.
By RFC (refutability calculus) we understand the calculus whose axioms and rules of inference are the following. The remaining rules of inference for 7 can be justified in analogous fashion.
A formula A is provable in RFC (or RFC-provable) iff the sequent + A is provable in RFC. Using some of the results about the intuitionistic predicate calculus and straightforward applications of the axioms and rules of RFC we obtain: THEOREM 1. (1) If a formula A is an instance of one of the axiom schema8 for the intuitionistic predicate calculus which do not explicitly involve the symbol 7 (i.e. axioms la, lb, 3, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 6 of KLEENE 1952 page 82) then A is RFC-provable.
(2) If the formula A contains no occurrence of 7 then A is provable in RFC ifl A is provable in the intuitionistic predicate calculus. It follows from theorem 1 that if a formula is RFC-provable then it is provable in the system for constructible falsity given in NELSON 1949 (and also in THOMASON 1969 . However, the schema 7 A 3 (A 3 B) is provable in Nelson's system but not in RFC. The simplest way to show that 7 A 3 (A 3 B) is not RFC-provable is to give a Kripke-style semantics for RFC.
3. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION FOR RFC
The interpretation of RFC using constructions is the most natural one from a constructive viewpoint. However before one could even attempt to prove the completeness of RFC under such interpretation one would have to set up a precise calculus for constructions.
Since the latter are usually rather complicated we prefer to suggest an alternative interpretation for RFC using a modification of the Kripke models for intuitionism. In order to avoid having too many subscripts we shall assume that formal language has only one non-logical constant; a binary relation symbol P. Then by an RFC-structure we understand a system of the form :
where I is a non empty set, K = ({%}ttz, Q > < is a reflexive, transitive relation on I, '%I= (AI, R$-, Rr-) where At is a non-empty (inhabited) set and Rt+, Riare subsets of At x At.
If i Q j then At C Aj, Re+ C RI+ and Rr-C Rf-. If K=({%f)tc~, 9) is an RFC-structure and j E I, then (K, j) (or simply KJ) will be called an RFC-realization and Aj the universe of K,. The way to interpret an RFC-structure K = ({%~]I~I, 9) is as follows : The elements of the index I are viewed as (possible) stages of knowledge and the elements of At as the individuals obtained by stage i. Re+ consists of those pairs (a, b) of elements of Ai for which there is evidence that P(a, b) holds; Rg-consists of those pairs of elements (a, b) for which there is evidence that P(a, b) does not hold. Since it is possible that at stage i there is neither evidence that P(a, b) holds nor that P(a, b) does not hold, it is not natural to require that the union of Rr+ and RI-be Ai x Aa. Also since at any given stage i it is possible to have conflicting evidence, we must allow the possibility that the intersection of Rr+ and Rt-be non-empty.
The formal definition of satisfaction is as follows: We extend the definition of satisfaction to sequents as follows: It would be more interesting to obtain the completeness theorem by constructive means, but since RFC includes intuitionism (provided enough predicates are used, see next section) it is unlikely that a constructive proof could be found.
On the other hand, even though the proof of the completeness theorem may not be philosophically gratifying, at least the semantics introduced can be used to obtain simple proofs of the independence of the following schemata (and many others):
AN ELEMENTARY NUMBER
THEORY BASED ON RFC The natural numbers is the obvious place to try out the applicability of RFC. One way would be to add to RFC the standard Peano's axioms. However such approach would be arbitrary and would be no more than an exercise in axiomatics. A more satisfying method is to go back to the intuitive concept of a natural number and then decide which sentences (sequenta) should be chosen as axioms.
We shall assume that a natural number is a construction, in fact we shall identify the natural number n with the construction that starts by construction 0 and ends with the.construction of n. Furthermore we accept Heyting's observation on page 13 of HEYTINCI 1966 that:
"The notion of natural number does not wme to us CM a bare notion, but frm the beginning it is clothed in properties which I can detect by simple observation".
To use the natural numbers come clothed with the following concepts : & (equality), + (successor), -(predecessor I)), + (addition),
. (multiplication) and 0 (zero).
The following sequents are to be included in the axioms since they can all be positively justified: Of the axioms which explicitly involve 7 the one hardest to justify is probably : And finally the following axioms, although more problematic than Nia-Ni6 because they involve going from refutations to proofs and conversely, are nevertheless no more awkward than Ni2:
N17 7 asO-+--*-+fa Nu a-+sa + 7 a2 0.
By PN we understand the formal system of elementary number theory whose logical basis is RFC and whose number theoretic postulates are Ndm It is clear that PN is a subtheory of classical number theory, furthermore it is a proper subtheory of classical number theory because it is a subtheory of the system Ni for constructible falsity introduced by NELSON 1949 (where it is also shown, by the use of realizability conditions that Ni is a proper subtheory of classical number theory).
The basic difference between PN and Nelson Ni is that in the underlying logic for Ni the law of the denial of the antecedent, -, A r> (A 1 B), is accepted as an axiom while in RFC it is not. The reason for not including it in RFC (or rather its equivalent sequent formulation)
is that it is difficult to visualize how to obtain, for arbitrary formulae A and B, a construction q which proves B from constructions p, T such that p proves A and r refutes A ; specially in the case when B has nothing to do with A ! Of course if A and B are both number theoretic formulae then the rejection of 7 A 3 (A r) B) on the grounds that A and B may have nothing to do with each other is questionable.
It turns out that in the case of PN the question of whether the law of the denial of the antecedent should be included or does not come up because it is provable in PN. In other words, RFC plus the axioms Ni-Nla (which are acceptable on grounds consistent with the principles of RFC) allows us to derive the schema 7 A r) (A 3 B) and thus PN is (extensionally) equivalent to Nelson's system Ni. The derivation of 7 A r) (A r) B) in PN is best broken down into two steps. In the first it is shown that 1 + 0 r) B and in the second that A& 7 A31+0.
The first observation that can be made about adding the unrestricted w-rule to PN is THEOREM 5. If PN, is the system obtained by ao%ing the unrestricted w-rule to PN then a sentence A is provable in PN, ifl A is (classically) true.
PROOF. It can be shown by induction on the complexity of A 1) that:
If A is true then t-rNo + A and if A is false then j-rNw + 7 A.
From a constructive viewpoint it is more natural to add a restricted w-rule. For example one could require that there be a recursive function 9 such that for each natural number n, v(n) is a Godel number of a proof of r+ A(n) in order to be allowed to derive r+ VxA(x) from r+ A(O), . . . . r-+ A(n), . . . .
Let PN,-, be the system obtained by adding the recursively restricted m-rule to PN.
The notion of P-realizability introduced in NELSON 1949 can be extended to sequents and then applying the fixed point theorem for partial recursive functions one obtains :
THEOREM 6. If a sentence A is provable in PN,-, then A is P-realizable. From theorem 6 it follows that (a) not all classically true formulae are provable in PN,-,, and (b) that some intuitionistic acceptable formulae are not provable in PN,-,,.
On the other hand it can be shown that if A" is the formula obtained from A by replacing all parts of the form -7 B by (B 11& 0) then A" is provable in PN, 
